-Dr. Wong Chin Huat, September 22, 2014
The parliamentary system therefore produces a “responsible government” by having the head of government and his/her government to the legislature, which has a fixed maximum term, and is in turn answerable to the voters.
In other words, there is a simple and straightforward chain of responsibility, between the voters, the voters, the lawmakers and the government.
This gives the government the legitimacy to rule because its policies would be what the electorate voted for in the election.
In other words, the electorate make their choice and should not complain if the elected politicians carry out the deal on their end.
In this sense, voters are supposed to be responsible too – you get what you vote for, so, you bear responsibility for the consequences of your choice.
Separation of state and government
Parliamentary government also makes it possible for a state to be a monarchy and a democracy at the same time.
The head of state can be unelected and hereditary, but the state can still be democratic, because the head of state is a figurehead and does not make substantial decisions.
And simply because the head of state does not make any substantial decisions, he/she is blameless and may reign as long as he/she lives.
Meanwhile, the head of government who gets to make substantial decisions have to bear the brunt of voters’ wrath if his/her decisions turn out to be unpopular.
In contrast, in presidential governments, the president is both the head of state and the head of government. And since the president makes substantial decisions, he/she must be elected for the state to stay democratic.
This however makes the president exposed to and tainted by party politics, and partisanship affects his/her ability to command patriotic love from fellow citizens.
In absolute monarchies, the monarch is the head of state and also the head of government – in reality, even if not in name. He cannot escape blame for failures in policy or governance.
And since there is not a regular exit mechanism like elections, unpopular monarchies often have to survive bloody crackdowns or collapse in bloody revolts.
This separation of state and government, through the division of labour between the head of state (monarch) and the head of government (prime/chief minister), argued the 19th Century English constitutional expert Walter Bagehot, is why the Westminster constitutional monarchy is superior.
People can love the head of state they don’t get to choose because they can overthrow at ballot box the government they loathe.
Popularity as commodity
In this democratic game, the commodity that matters the most is popularity, not competence, integrity, piety or pedigree.
Why? Popularity can be objectively assessed, while competence, integrity, piety or even pedigree may be subjectively disputed.
The demand of popularity in fact applies on both the head of government and the head of state.
For the office of head of government, competence, integrity, piety or pedigree is only useful insofar it delivers popularity in elections and ultimately, the legislature.
Pushing it to the extreme, democracy means even if the people love an idiot or a villain so much that they give his/her party a majority in the legislature, then the idiot or the villain must be made the head of government.
Any damage by an inept or bad leader can only be checked by law, not by preventing him/her getting power. After all, who is there to decide that the people have made the wrong choice?
In picking the head of government, there are simply no decision makers higher than the people and their elected representatives – that’s what “popular sovereignty” is all about.
Meanwhile, the head of state needs to be popular so that he/she can command the loyalty of the citizens. Competence or intelligence is not required because the head of state need not make substantial decisions.
And to be popular – in the sense of acceptability by all segments of society, and not playing to the gallery – is fundamentally about playing according to the rules, where lifelong training through exclusive upbringing in palace may indeed be an advantage.
One virtue of having an unelected and non-partisan head of state is then that political life can be more predictable.
While the head of government and other politicians may be driven by electoral pressures to pull off unpleasant surprises, one can expect the head of state to remain an assuring constant in the volatility of electoral tides.
New political system
Before 2008, barring a few cases of royal displeasure, the ruling coalition had got their way in deciding their federal and state leaders.
As former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad (right) said, he only needed to submit one name in nominating the heads of state government.
A continuity of this after 2008 would have smoothened Malaysia’s transition from an electoral one-party state to a multiparty democracy. Monarchy can be a guardian of fledgling democracy, like King Juan Carlos was to post-Franco Spain.
It has been reported today that PKR deputy president Azmin Ali has received the appointment letter to be the next menteri besar from the Selangor palace.
If Wan Azizah who has the support of 30 state lawmakers – a clear majority in a 56-member legislature – had been appointed as menteri besar of Selangor, we know then the original system is still in place and functioning.
Otherwise, not only Selangor, but Malaysia too, is sailing into uncharted waters. If the legislative majority cannot nominate their leader as the head of government, why should the new government be accountable first to the legislature and not the palace that appoints it?
We will effectively have a new political system without even a stroke of pen on the constitution. One may not know what to call the new system – perhaps ‘Monarchy ala Thailand’?
Pakatan’s options
How should Pakatan or specifically PKR respond to this likely scenario?
Option 1: Pakatan can order the lawmaker to turn down the offer or sack the person as how PKR did to Khalid Ibrahim (right) when he refused to step down as 
menteri besar.
The appointee may hold his power till the next assembly is convened, assuming a judicial remedy is not available or obtained. If Pakatan can pass a motion of no-confidence against the new MB, likely a fresh election may then be forced.
This would be the most congruent and principled response. The price is prolonged confrontation with the palace which may hurt the parties, given a controlled media environment and public sphere.
Option 2: Pakatan may want to recognise and rectify a big loophole in the political system, which has been used to justify the royal intervention. In UK or Australia, the ruling party can change its leader anytime, with completely no room for the queen or the governor-general to select the new head of government, because the party leader is elected by the ruling party’s lawmakers through the caucus.
If Pakatan wants to reclaim its power to nominate the head of government, whether for Selangor or even whole of Malaysia, it should consider to institutionalise the party caucus as a mechanism of leadership election and even as a check and balance in general.
If the new menteri besar knows he can be sacked by his peers even though he may have owed his appointment to the palace, then he cannot ignore his peers, and a responsible government may not be a completely lost cause.
Of course, Pakatan can also simply accept the new reality and do nothing. However, if it does so, it should not be surprised if voters don’t want to risk a replay of Selangor at Putrajaya in the next election.
WONG CHIN HUAT earned his PhD from the University of Essex with a thesis on the electoral system and party system in peninsular Malaysia. He is a fellow at the Penang Institute.
